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COAL POLICY - NEED IT BE THE
WEST AGAINST THE REST?
C. Peter Goplerud III*
Duffy Ruimerman**
Oil, natural gas, and coal constitute the three primary sources
for industrial and personal energy use in this country. In recent
years, however, supplies of oil and natural gas have been dwindling.1 The 1973 Arab oil embargo focused the attention of the
American public for the first time on the important role and detrimental effects of heavy foreign oil consumption. More recently,
developments in Iran brought renewed emphasis on attempts to
shift energy usage away from imported oil. As part of this emphasis, President Carter urged that increased attention be paid
to the nation's most abundant energy resource: coal.
The United States possesses thirty-one percent of the world's
economically recoverable coal reserves,2 and coal comprises
roughly ninety percent of total United States fossil-fuel
reserves. 3 Despite these enormous reserves, coal lags behind as a
source of energy. In 1977, coal supplied only eighteen percent of
total American energy needs, compared to a seventy-five percent
share for oil and natural gas.4 Thus, beginning in 1977 with the
announcement of the National Energy Plan,5 development and
use of the nation's vast coal resources became a focal point of
controversy, government policymaking, and industrial planning.
Since the Plan's inception, however, no drastic change has oc* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. B.A., 1971,
J.D., 1974, University of Kansas. This Article is part of a forthcoming book by Professor
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1. See ENERGY POLICY AND PLANNING, ExEcIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN 11-19 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN].
2. Pelham, Bright Future Seen for Coal, But Many Problems Remain, 38 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 1481 (1980).
3. NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN, supra note 1, at xii.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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curred to remedy the disproportionate emphasis on oil and natural gas, over coal, as energy sources. Although coal use has increased by about five percent annually, and production is
projected to reach one billion tons by 1985,6 the industry operates presently at a level far below its actual capacity: twelve percent of the estimated 1980 coal production of approximately 825
million tons7 never was produced.8 The 20,000 miners who are
presently unemployed8 further demonstrate the lack of a strong
market for coal.
This picture seems inconsistent with the announced policy
aim to promote coal production and consumption. In tracing the
roots of this inconsistency, no simple or clear answer exists, for a
multitude of factors come into play. The lack of a definitive national energy policy,10 though, certainly constitutes an important
deficiency, despite the comprehensive scope of the original National Energy Plan.11 A more important factor, however, may be
6. Pelham, supra note 2, at 1483. This contrasts with the National Energy Plan,
which sought to increase production to about 1.2 billion tons annually by 1985. See NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN, supra note 1, at 63-64, 94-96.
7. See Franklin, Coal's Future, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, § 1, at 1, col 1.
8. The industry has 100 million tons of excess capacity. Pelham, supra note 2, at
1481.
9. Id.
10. See generally Entin, Energy Politics in the House of Representatives: The National Energy Plan, 11 CONN. L. REV. 403 (1979).
11. A number of pieces of federal legislation - several focusing on coal use and development - could form the basis for such a national energy policy. The Energy Supply
and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 791-792 (1976 & Supp. m
1979) ("ESECA"), was the first pro-coal legislation to emerge in the 1970's. ESECA provided authority for ordering utilities using oil or natural gas to convert to coal and generally required new plants to be designed to utilize coal. The impact of ESECA was negligible, however, leading Congress to enact in 1978 the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8483 (Supp. ill 1979) ("FUA"). FUA, one of five parts of the
National Energy Act of 1978, serves essentially as a replacement for ESECA. It encourages substitution of coal for oil and natural gas in electric generating plants and industrial boilers, see id. § 8341, and it also prohibits new facilities from using oil or natural
gas as a primary source, id. § 8311.
Most recently, Congress enacted the Energy Security Act of 1980, P.L. 96-294, 94 Stat.
611 (to be codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8701-8912), establishing the United States
Synthetic Fuels Corporation. The Corporation is authorized to provide up to $20 billion
in subsidies to industrial concerns wishing to construct facilities to produce synthetic
fuel from, among other resources, coal. Finally, in 1980 yet another effort was undertaken to encourage conversion to coal by utilities, particularly in the Northeast. The socalled "Oil Back-out" bill, S. 2470, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S8092 (1980),
which would have provided loans and grants to enable some 80 power plants to convert
from oil and natural gas to coal as a fuel source, passed the Senate but never found its
way to the floor of the House.
Given the apparent congressional interest, there must be stumbling blocks which have
blocked major increases in coal production. Arguments can be made that the various
pieces of environmental legislation and their accompanying regulations stifle increased
coal development. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. ill 1979), for exam-
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the conflict between regionalism and nationalism - a contemporary version of the time-honored battle between states' rights
and a .strong central government. 12 Specifically, the interests of
the Western States18 - actors critical to the development of the
country's coal reserves - are not necessarily harmonious with
the national policy to promote coal production and
consumption.
The Western States possess roughly fifty-four percent of the
nation's economically recoverable coal reserves, 14 with a full
ple, imposes strict limitations upon emissions of sulphur dioxide, particulates, and nitrogen oxides, all of which result from burning coal. Moreover, coal-fired power plants and
coal mines present serious water pollution problems which are stringently regulated
under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Finally,
coal-burning plants produce some hazardous wastes, especially at plants employing flue
gas desulphurization equipment (scrubbers), disposal of which is regulated by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. ill 1979).
Remedying these various pollution problems arising from coal use has· proved to be
costly, time consuming, and, in some cases, politically difficult.
Further concerns arise that transportation issues will frustrate gains in coal production. Over the last several years there has been a critical shortage of railroad hopper cars
used for transporting coal. Additionally, there have been bureaucratic delays in approving new rail lines important to coal production, such as the long-delayed Star Lake Railroad which, if ever approved, would form a link with substantial coal deposits in the Star
Lake Bisti area of northwest New Mexico. Coal Leases on BLM Lands in New Mexico:
Hearing Before the Subcqmm. on Energy Resources and Materials Production of the
Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1979) (statement of Arthur W. Zimmerman). The alternative mode of traµsporting coal - the slurry
pipeline, a system whereby coal is pulverized and pumped through a pipeline to a distribution center - appears mired in political and legal difficulties. Railroads strenuously
resist this encroachment upon their near-monopoly over coal transportation, and many
localities oppose granting rights of y,ay to such a pipeline.
Finally, coal development may be slowed by resistance to the economic and social impacts arising from intensive production activities. Many fear the boomtown syndrome,
where a sudden influx of people associated with mining or other coal-related activities
can have a devastating effect on the fiber of a region. See, e.g., Goplerud & O'Neil, Coal
Gasification: The Critical Issues, 58 DEN. L.J. 35, 44-46 {1980); Little, Some Social Consequences of Boom Towns, 53 N.D. L. REv. 401 (1977).
12. See Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Control the Public Lands?,
1980 UTAH L. REV. 505; Rocky Mountain High, TIME, Dec. 15, 1980, at 28; The Angry
West Vs. the Rest, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 17, 1979, at 31.
13. For purposes of this Article, "Western States" refers to Montana, Wyoming,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Colorado, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, Idaho, and Arizona.
Energy concerns in the West are significant enough that two different organizations have
been formed by the state governments in the region to foster Western programs and
policies. One is the Western Governor's Policy Office. Members of this organization include North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, and Alaska. The other organization, the Western Interstate Energy
Board, is composed of the same states plus Idaho, Washington, Oregon, California, and
Hawaii.
14. FEDERAL CoAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S.
DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT 2-1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
COAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT]; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LmRARY OF CONGRESS, THE ENERGY FACTBOOK 582-83 (Comm. Print 96-IFC-60, 1980) [hereinafter cited
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forty percent of the nation's reserves located in Wyoming and
Montana alone. 15 Much of this coal, however, lies beneath public
lands or has been retained by· the federal government during various historical land grants, so that the federal government controls approximately eighty percent of the coal reserves18 and
owns nearly half the land17 in the Western States. Government
land ownership ranges from thirty percent in Montana to eightyseven percent in Nevada. 18 This ownership of land and resources
gives the federal government almost complete control over coal
production west of the Mississippi. Thus arises the conflict between the Western States and the federal government, perceived
frequently as an absentee landlord. Many in the West do not
want Washington to dictate how and when to develop the region's natural resources; these people bristle under domination
by federal policies. 19
Some federal officials and business leaders, however, argue
that decisions regarding whether to open an area for coal development should rest with the owners of the land.20 As noted, this
approach would leave most development decisions in the West
with the federal government. Westerners counter, though, that
this orientation overlooks, or oversimplifies, the impact of such
development upon nearby land and communities. 21 These people
face concerns far more immediate than the importance of coal to
as ENERGY FACTBOOK]. See also Horwitch, Coal: Constrained Abundance, in ENERGY FuTURE: REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL 79, 87 (1979}.
"Reserves" denotes coal that can be mined at prevailing market prices.
15. ENERGY FACTBOOK, supra note 14, at 582. See also Coal Severance Taxes: Hearings on H.R. 6625, 6654, and 7163 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980)
(statement of Samuel L. Devine) [hereinafter cited as Severance Tax Hearings].
16. CoAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 2-1.
17. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS
1979, at 9.
18. Id. See generally AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, Two ENERGY FuTURES: A NATIONAL CHOICE FOR THE 80s 62-68 (1980}; P. GATES & R. SWENSON, HISTORY OF PUBLIC
LAND LAw DEVELOPMENT (1968); PUBLIC LAND LAW REV. CoMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND (1970); Watson, The Federal Coal Follies-A New Program Ends (Begins)
A Decade of Anxiety??, 58 DEN. L.J. 65 (1980).
19. See A Second American Revolution, Address by Sen. Orrin Hatch to Western
Coalition on Public Lands, Reno, Nevada (Sept. 6, 1979) [on .file with the Journal of Law
Reform]; Melloan, Rebellious Mood in the West, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1979, at 16, col. 3;
NEWSWEEK, supra note 12, at 32.
20. See White & Barry, Energy Development in the West: Conflict and Coordination
of Governmental Decision-Making, 52 N.D. L. REv. 451, 500 (1976).
21. Rock Springs and Green River, Wyoming, are two examples of communities
which have suffered adversely from the impacts of energy development. See Daley, Financing Housing and Public Facilities in Energy Boom Towns, in 22 ROCKY MT. MIN. L.
INST. PROCEEDINGS 47, 49-50 (1976). See generally Gilmore, Boom Towns May Hinder
Energy Development, 191 SCIENCE 535 (1976).
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the nation's energy future. ·
This Article will analyze the legal issues involved in this
"West against the rest" conflict. While numerous areas of disagreement exist within the larger picture of Western-federal relations, the Article will focus on two specific issues of present concern. First, the Article will explore the role of the states under
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977.22 This
section includes an analysis of recent litigation involving regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior relating to
the establishment of state mining programs. Second, the Article
will address the imposition of state severance taxes on coal, with
particular emphasis on the Montana tax sustained recently by
the Supreme Court. The Article's essential premise is that sound
policy should balance the substantial federal interest in development of Western energy sources against state and local concerns
regarding the social, economic, and environmental impacts of
this development. 28
I.

SURFACE MINING

Surface mining presently produces approximately sixty-one
percent of the coal mined in this country. 24 Beyond doubt, this
mining method, while· an expedient means of production, seriously disrupts the land. This disruption in the past has been felt
particularly in several Eastern states,25 and by the mid-1970's it
became apparent that various Western states soon would be affected. Programs enacted at the state level to combat the adverse effects of strip mining were largely unsuccessful.26 Thus,
Congress aimed for a federal regulatory scheme which would satisfy the need for a rational approach both to strip mining and to
efforts at reclaiming the land after strip-mining efforts had been
completed.
Toward this end, in 1977 Congress enacted the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act21 ("SMCRA"). The SMCRA
contains several very important and explicit findings and pur22. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979).
23. See Harvey, Federal-State Relationships in Federal Land and Resource Man·
agement, 54 DEN. L.J. 585, 588-89 (1977).
24. ENERGY FACTB0OK, supra note 14, at 548.
25. See H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 58, reprinted in (1977) U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEWS 593, 596 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 218).
26. H.R. REP. No. 218, supra note 25, at 73.
27. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979).
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poses. Congress made clear its understanding of the potential
devastation caused by surface mining,28 while emphasizing the
importance of coal production to the nation's energy future. 29
Through the SMCRA, Congress aimed to create a national program for controlling the methods and effects of surface mining,
in a manner calculated to protect the environment and to provide the coal deemed necessary for energy stability. 30 Most importantly, for purposes of this Article, Congress found that due
to "the diversity in terrain, climate, biologic, chemical, or other
physical conditions in areas subject to mining operations, the
primary governmental responsibility for developing, authorizing, issuing, and enforcing regulations for surface mining and
reclamation operations subject to [the SMCRAJ should rest
with the States." 31 This concept of state control or "primacy"
was emphasized several times during consideration of the SMCRA.32 The concept had been found workable for air and water
pollution control and was perceived as essential to successful
management of surface mining.33

A. Constitutional Challenges to the SMCRA
Within a short time after enactment, the SMCRA began to
come under close scrutiny from the states and various mining
concerns. Litigants in Virginia,8• Indiana,u Iowa,38 and Tennes28. Id. § 120l(c).
29. Id. § 120l(d).
30. Id. § 1202.
31. Id. § 120l(f)(emphasis added).
32. See H.R. REP. No. 218, supra note 25, at 57, 129.
33. The key to the Act is Title V, designed to lay the groundwork for control of the
environmental impacts of surface mining. Parties intending to conduct surface mining
operations must obtain a permit either from the state where the operations will occur, or
from the Federal Office of Surface Mining Enforcement and Reclamation, depending
upon which authority has responsibility for the program. 30 U.S.C. § 1256 (Supp. III
1979). The SMCRA sets forth specific design criteria and performance standards which
must be incorporated into the permit. Id. §§ 1257, 1265. The permit cannot be issued
without preparation by the operator of a reclamation plan. Id. § 1258. Furthermore, the
operator must file a performance bond prior to issuance of the permit, id. § 1259, guaranteeing adherence to the requirements of the permit. The SMCRA also describes procedures and criteria for designation of particular areas as unsuitable for surface mining. Id.
§ 1272. Finally, the Act requires operators to pay a fee of 35 cents per ton of coal produced to fund reclamation activities at abandoned mine sites. Id. § 1232.
34. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
35. Hodel v. Indiana, 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981). See also Andrus v. P-Burg Coal Co., 495
F. Supp. 82 (S.D. Ind. 1980), af/'d, 644 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir. 1981).
36. Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. 1325 (S.D. Iowa 1980), vacated sub nom.
Watt v: Star Coal Co., 101 S. Ct. 3132 (1981).
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see37 have challenged the legislation on the basis of the commerce clause and the fifth and tenth amendments. The most recent constitutional attacks on the SMCRA, Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Association38 and Hodel v. Indiana, 39 form the basis of analysis here. Although the cases were
not consolidated, Justice Marshall, author of both majority opinions, apparently focused upon Virginia 40 as the "lead" decision;
this Article will do likewise.
The cases advanced two constitutional objections to the
SMCRA. The first and least appealing contention was that the
commerce clause41 did not authorize the legislation. Although
. one lower court"2 had agreed with the contention that the
SMCRA's restraints on land use regulated purely local activity
having no impact on interstate commerce, the Supreme Court
disagreed, finding the legislation to have a firm commerce clause
basis. Congress had made explicit findings, expressed in the text
of the Act, that surface mining influences interstate commerce
- and the Court continued a long trend of deference to congressional findings regarding the impact of activities upon interstate
commerce." 8 Beyond doubt, coal mining has some effect upon interstate commerce, even though mining operations themselves
are purely local activities."" Given this effect, the concerns reflected in the SMCRA - for the long-term productivity of mine
lands and for avoiding health and safety hazards in mining fall within the scope of Congress' power to adopt reasonable
means for regulating interstate commerce.415 The decisions are
consistent with previous cases and do not expand the already
broad powers of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.48
37. Concerned Citizens of Appalachia, Inc. v. Andrus, 494 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Tenn.
1980), rev'd mem., No. 80-1448 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 1982).
38. 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
39. 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981).
40. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
42. Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Ind. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Hodel v.
Indiana, 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981).
·
43. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. at 2359-64.
44. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
45. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. at 2362-64.
46. Justice Rehnquist, concurring in Virginia, expressed his fear that the majority
had broadened the expansive scope of congressional power under the commerce clause.
He criticized the majority approach for its failure to emphasize that Congress may regulate only those activities having a "substantial effect" upon interstate commerce; the
majority's various renditions of the commerce clause test had included the "substantial"
phraseology only once.
This concern, however, appears to be a false alarm. The Court has not unfailingly
included the term "substantial" when describing the test to be utilized in assessing con-
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The more significant and substantial issue presented to the
Court involved the argument that several sections of the
SMCRA violated tenth amendment limits on congressional
power;n This argument gave the Court an opportunity to reexamine its holding in National League of Cities v. Usery, 48 at a
time when the banner of states' rights is attracting great followings, particularly in the West. National League of Cities involved a challenge to amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act49 requiring state and local governments to observe minimum
wage and maximum hour regulations. The Court there concluded that the tenth amendment bars exercise of the commerce
clause authority in ways impairing "States' 'ability to function
effectively in a federal system'."110
In Virginia, the Court stood by the approach of National
League of Cities, enunciating a three-part test for approaching
tenth amendment challenges to the exercise of federal power. Invalidation of congressional regulation on tenth amendment
grounds would require, at a minimum, (1) "a showing that the
challenged statute regulates the 'States as States'," (2) a showing that the federal regulation addresses "matters which are
clearly 'attributes of state sovereignty'," and (3) a finding "that
the States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions'." 111 Under this approach, the
Court correctly rejected the tenth amendment challenges to provisions of the SMCRA, because the legislation did not regulate
the "States as States" as required by the first element of the
test. 112
gressional regulation of interstate commerce. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 303 (1964). Furthermore, the activities under regulation have such apparent effects
upon interstate commerce that no great significance should be attached to the absence of
the "substantial effect" terminology. If the case involved more isolated or localized activity, perhaps the Court's particular language would have import, but strip mining arguably has a far greater impact upon interstate commerce than operating a motel or restaurant, both of which have been held to be subject to congressional power over interstate
commerce. See id.; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
47. Virginia involved a challenge to a provision requiring surface mining operators on
steep slopes to return the land to its "approximate original contour," 30 U.S.C.
§ 1365(d) (Supp. III 1979). 101 S. Ct. at 2364. In Indiana, the general "approximate
original contour" requirement, 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(3) (Supp. III 1979), and the various
"prime farmland" provisions were challenged. 101 S. Ct. at 2380, 2381 & n.6, 2385-86.
48. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
50. 426 U.S. at 852 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1974)).
51. 101 S. Ct. at 2366 (quoting 426 U.S. at 845, 852, 854).
52. But see Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Ass'n, Inc. v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425,
431-35 (W.D. Va. 1980) (arguing that the SMCRA contravenes the tenth amendment
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The Court's ruling on the tenth amendment question seems
inescapably correct. Strictly speaking, the SMCRA addresses the
activities of private coal _operators, and thus does not regulate
the "States as States." The Act does not require state legislation
or regulation, or the expenditure of state funds. 113 To invalidate
federal legislation which does not impose specific requirements
on the "States as States" would greatly weaken legitimate congressional authority over vital aspects of commerce. The
SMCRA represents an exercise in "cooperative federalism," 114
not unlike other environmental legislation. 1111 Private citizens, not
governmental entities, are those directly regulated - and "nothing in National League of Cities suggests that the Tenth
Amendment shields the States from pre-emptive federal regulation of private activities affecting interstate commerce."116
There is, however, one troubling aspect of the Court's resolution of the tenth amendment issue. The majority opinion seems
to have adopted the view, first expressed in Justice Blackmun's
concurrence in National League of Cities, that the federal government might have greater leeway to operate in areas traditionally reserved to the states where a "demonstrably greater" federal interest, such as environmental protection, is at stake.117 In
Virginia, the Court made specific reference to Blackmun's concurrence to support the proposition that a tenth amendment
challenge to congressional action would not necessarily be successful even if all elements of the three-part test were satisfied,
observing that "the nature of the federal interest advanced may
be such that it justifies State submission. " 118 The difficulty with
this approach, though, is its lack of a constitutional foundation.
The Constitution does not grant Congress expanded powers to
intrude upon state sovereignty regarding specific subject matters
such as health or environmental regulation. While the underlying policies may have appeal to some environmentalists, the
because it interferes with the state's plan for economic development, undermines the
state's economy, forces the state to spend money in compliance with the federal scheme,
and deprives the state of the ability to choose how best to protect the environment),
reu'd sub nom; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Ass'n, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2352
(1981); Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452, 461-68 (S.D. Ind. 1980) (upholding challenges to the SMCRA under the tenth amendment because land use control and planning decisions constitute areas of traditional state sovereignty that are displaced by the
legislation), reu'd sub nom. Hodel v. Indiana, 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981).
53. 101 S. Ct. at 2366.
54. Id.
55. Id. n.30.
56. Id. at 2367.
57. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
58. 101 S. Ct. at 2366 n.29. ·
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ramifications for the federalist system are severe indeed. The
approach endorsed in Virginia might enable Congress, under the
guise of environmental concerns, to enact elaborate regulatory
schemes usurping traditional state functions. The Court should
move to eliminate this possibility at its earliest convenience.
The Virginia and Indiana decisions should not be viewed as a
setback for Westerners. The SMCRA, in fact, has been generally
accepted in the West. Much of the feuding and interference with
state governmental operations has stemmed, and will continue
to stem, from the manner in which the Office of Surface Mining
has administered the SMCRA. 69 The Interior Department recently has moved to address this problem by reorganizing the
Office of Surface Mining so as to deemphasize the federal government's role under the SMCRA.60 Although these actions are
controversial and may be challenged through litigation, in the
West this deemphasis may prove ultimately beneficial both to
surface mining and the environment. Congress clearly intended
that the Office of Surface Mining would merely oversee the
states' conduct under the SMCRA;61 returning the Office of Surface Mining to its intended role would likely improve the efficiency of Western surface mining programs. The Western States
generally have formulated good, workable programs under the
SMCRA,62 and they have no intention of allowing devastation of
their lands should the federal government adopt a less intrusive
stance in the regulation of surface mining.63
59. Governor Herschler of Wyoming, for instance, argues that the Office of Surface
Mining has frustrated the congressional desire for a partnership between the states and
federal government in the administration of surface mining programs: "They give us excuses, justifications, offer to work hand in hand, reassurance that we are to receive primacy - but they deny us the things that count." Oversight - The Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Energy
and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Surface Mining Oversight Hearings).
60. See notes 101-03 and accompanying text infra.
61. See H.R. REP. No. 218, supra note 25, at 57, 129.
62. Several Western State regulatory programs have been approved. See 45 Fed. Reg.
82,211 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 906) (Colorado); 30 C.F.R. § 926 (1980)
(Montana); 45 Fed. Reg. 86,489 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 931) (New Mexico);
45 Fed. Reg. 82,246 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 934) (North Dakota); 46 Fed.
Reg. 5,913 (1981) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 944) (Utah); 45 Fed. Reg. 78,684, 84,765
(1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 950) (Wyoming).
63. See Surface Mining Oversight Hearings, supra note 59, at 26-27 (remarks of
Wyoming Governor Herschler).
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B. Permanent Program Regulations Under the SMCRA
Implementation of the SMCRA requires issuance of regulations by the Office of Surface Mining.64 Congress devised a twostep process for implementation of the legislation while intending that the states would assume primary administrative
and enforcement responsibilities under the Act. 611 The SMCRA
contemplated an interim regulatory period, wherein permits
would be issued by the state on the basis of provisional regulations formulated by the Office of Surface Mining. 68 Ultimately,
the Office of Surface Mining would promulgate regulations permanently implementing the SMCRA, providing far more specific
and detailed design criteria and performance standards than
contained in the legislation itself. 67
The attention of mine operators, government officials, and
public interest groups must focus on the structure of regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior for permanent
mining programs, and on the state programs devised to comply
with those regulations. This regulatory package, by controlling
daily mining operations and the scope of government oversight,
will dictate where the power over strip-mining operations will lie
- with the states ·or with the federal government. Given the
surge in Western strip mining, the regulations will be instrumental in determining whether coal policy indeed aligns "the West
against the rest. " 68
64. 30 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. III 1979). The statutory lahguage refers to the Secretary,
but, in practice, the regulations have been formulated by the Office of Surface Mining.
65. See id. §§ 1251-1254.
66. See 30 C.F.R. § 710 (1980).
67. See id. §§ 700-890.
68. The status of the permanent program regulations, however, is uncertain. The program implementing the SMCRA faces a cloudy future after its stormy beginnings. Congress originally intended that the states would submit their programs to the Secretary of
the Interior for approval by February 3, 1979. 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (Supp. III 1979). Because of delays, though, the Secretary's regulations themselves were not promulgated
until March 13, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 14,902 (1979), and the states were given until March
3, 1980, to submit their programs, 30 C.F.R. § 731.12 (1980). At this writing, all but three
states - Alaska, Georgia, and Washington - affected by the SMCRA have submitted
programs.
Even in states with submitted programs, substantial uncertainty remains. Numerous
state courts have enjoined operation of the state programs pending resolution of the various challenges to regulations issued by the Secretary. See, e.g., Alabama Surface Mining
Reel. Council v. Alabama SMRC, No. CV 80-369 (Walker County Ala. Cir. Ct. Nov. 12,
1980); Illinois Coal Ass'n v. Illinois Dep't of Mines & Minerals, No. 80-CH-303 (Ill. 7th
Cir. Ct. Dec. 11, 1980); Meadowlark Farms v. Indiana Dep't of Natural Resources, No.
C80-1952 (Marion Ind. Cir. Ct. July 29, 1980); Morris & Marshall, Inc. v. Kentucky, No.
90-C.1.-238 (Martin Ky. Cir. Ct. Oct. 31, 1980); Maryland Coal Ass'n v. Department of
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The Secretary of the Interior's power to issue regulations extending beyond the existing contours of the SMCRA has not
gone unquestioned. The Peabody Coal Company recently challenged the Secretary's authority to issue regulations requiring
mining-permit applicants to submit information beyond that required by the SMCRA itself.69 Peabody contended that- given
the explicit, meticulous requirements set forth in the SMCRA
regarding permit applications and reclamation plans70 - the Act
barred the Secretary from going beyond its provisions when formulating rules. In response, the Secretary urged that his statutorily mandated oversight role would have no meaning without the
authority "to seek more information in the permit application
than explicitly required by statute."71
The court acknowledged the validity of Peabody's position,
based upon the concept of state primacy, that the SMCRA did
not empower the federal government to intrude unduly into
state strip mining programs.72 Nonetheless, the court found statutory authority, consistent with state primacy, enabling the Sec•
retary of the Interior to issue rules extending federal involvement in state-administered mining operations beyond the
specific dictates of the SMCRA. Under section 201(c)(2) of the
legislation, the Secretary has authority to "publish and promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes and provisions of [the Act]."73 Such a general grant
of authority, similar to provisions of the Clean Air Act7 " and the
Clean Water Act,76 has been construed broadly by the courts.78
Natural Resources, No. 35343 (Allegany County Md. Cir. Ct. May 1, 1981); Ohio Coal &
Energy Ass'n v. Ohio, No. 80CV-11-6152 (Franklin County Ohio Ct. C.P. Nov. 24, 1980);
Consolidation Coal v. Ohio, No. A-CIV-266 (Belmont County Ohio Ct. C.P. Nov. 1980);
Pennsylvania Coal Mining Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, Nos. 21718, 21719 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Nov. 26, 1980, Dec. 24, 1980, Feb. 13, 1981); Virginia Surface Mining & Reel Ass'n v.
Virginia DCED, No. 4863 (Va. Ch. Dec. 3, 1980); Alleghany Mining Corp. v. Callaghan,
No. 81-579 (Kanawha County W. Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 13, 1981).
69. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 653 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (en bane), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 80-1863).
70. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1257-1258 (Supp. III 1979).
71. 653 F.2d at 519.
72. Id. at 519-20. Under a properly functioning state program, the state, not the federal government, issues permits; thus the state controls which interests may mine a parcel, and the duration and operating conditions of that mining. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1256,
1260 (Supp. III 1979). The state passes on the suitability of reclamation efforts, see id.
§ 1260(b), inspects the mining operations, see id. §§ 1259, 1267, and imposes sanctions
for violations of permit conditions, see id. § 1268(i). But see id. § 1271(b) (empowering
the Secretary of the Interior to take over a state mining program when the state fails to
adequately administer and enforce the program).
73. 30 U.S.C. § 1211(c)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(l) (Supp. III 1979).
75. 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (Supp. III 1979).
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In keeping with this approach, the court rejected Peabody's
argument - based upon the presence within the SMCRA of
twenty-one specific grants of rulemaking power - that this section merely summarizes the Secretary's powers under the legislation and cannot provide an independent justification for federal
regulatory action. 77
Furthermore, the court found implied authority to issue the
challenged regulations in section 501(b) of the SMCRA, which
requires the Secretary to promulgate permanent regulations governing surface coal mining and reclamation operations.78 While
Peabody Coal contended that section 501(b) simply enables the
Secretary to issue "mechanical" provisions regarding formal aspects of the permit process,79 the court accepted the Secretary's
opinion that the informational provisions of the SMCRA require
supplementation through section 501(b) to ensure effective implementation of the Act. 80
Aside from the specific question regarding the proper interpretation of the rulemaking sections of the SMCRA, Peabody
advanced a more general argument based upon the overall structure of the Act. Peabody contended that the state, as opposed to
the federal, government must have the power to specify information required of mining-permit applicants, because the SMCRA
grants the state exclusive authority to make permit-issuing decisions.81 The court, in rejecting this" 'common sense' rule of regulatory authority,"82 noted that although individual state permit
decisions were not subject to federal review, overall state performance under the SMCRA would be reviewed; the Secretary
thus could require information to enable vigilant federal attention to state performance under the SMCRA.83
The decision is flawed in several respects. First, the court
acted inappropriately in placing heavy reliance upon the Secretary's assessment "that the explicit information provisions included in the Act should be supplemented to guarantee its effective implementation."8 ' While the court argued that
"[d]eference to the administering agency is particularly appropriate" when questions arise involving a hard-fought statute
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
653 F.2d at 523-24.
30 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. III 1979).
653 F.2d at 524.
,
Id. at 522-24.
Id. at 525-26.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 522.
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such as the SMCRA,811 in fact deference to the Secretary's assessment seems peculiarly inappropriate when the federal
agency is asked to strike the proper balance between state and
federal interests.86 Deference to a federal agency appears inconsistent with the statutory scheme of entrusting "primary government responsibility" to the states under the Act. 87 Second, the
court evinced a distrust of state implementation of the legislation, thus giving too little weight to the overall statutory scheme.
The court began its analysis of the Secretary's power to issue
supplementary regulations by observing "that Congress was not
interested in perpetuating the existing tradition of state mining
regulation," concluding that "Congress did not withhold powers
that the Secretary might require in his efforts to safeguard federal interests."88 This conclusion, however, does not nec:essarily
flow from the observed congressional discontent with prior state
practices. Congress' response to the states' failure to police strip
mining practices adequately, ironic though it may be, was to devise legislation placing primary respcmsibility with those selfsame states. Congress intended the states to be responsible under a carefully orchestrated set of provisions contained within
the SMCRA - to carry out its will. The court's notion that the
Secretary should be allowed "to tell the states that they need
more information to meet their responsibilities"89 disregards the
goal implicit in the statutory structure that the states should operate with a minimum level of federal interference. 80
The SMCRA itself sets forth minimum requirements for information gathering, permit procedures, and the general operations of a state program.91 The states should be entrusted with
broad discretion, provided these statutory minima are satisfied.es
The regulations promulgated by the Secretary, however, layered
onto the already detailed standards provided in the SMCRA, effectively negate the possibilities for state discretion. While the
Secretary contended that the states retained adequate discretion
through the "state window" provision enabling adoption of alternatives "consistent with the regulations" issued by the Secre85. Id.
86. Id. at 533 & n.11 (Tamm, J., dissenting).
87. 30 U.S.C. § i201(O (Supp. III 1979); see 653 F.2d at 531 (Tamm, J., dissenting)
("look broadly at the Act's purposes and structure to decide which approach is more
faithful to Congress's overall design").
88. 653 F.2d at 521.
89. Id. at 526.
90. See note 65 supra.
91. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1253(a), 1256, 1257(b) (Supp. III 1979).
92. See 653 F.2d at 531-34 (Tamm, J., dissenting).
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tary, 93 Judge Tamm's dissent aptly described this window as a
"one-way mirror."" Under the "state window" guidelines, a
state-proposed alternative to the Secretary's regulations will be
found "consistent with" those regulations only when "the state
laws and regulations are no less stringent than and meet the applicable provisions of this Act," 91~ thus leaving little leeway in
fact to the States. 98
The Secretary of the Interior should not be allowed to intrude
upon the discretion entrusted to the states by the SMCRA. The
congressional deliberations, with their emphasis upon state primacy in the regulation of surface mining,97 acknowledged the
wisdom of providing the states maximum flexibility to tailor
mining programs. 98 As Judge Tamm noted in dissent, however,
honoring the flexibility contained wit~in the SMCRA would not
strip the Secretary of power under the Act. The Secretary can
issue interpretative rulings regarding the informational provisions of the SMCRA, and he has the authority to recommend
requirements more stringent than those found in the Act. Moreover, the Secretary retains power under the SMCRA to assume
administration and enforcement of the Act if a state is found to
be derelict in its responsibilities. 99 Limiting the scope of the Secretary's authority to the provisions of the SMCRA thus strikes
93. 30 C.F.R. § 731.13(c)(l) (1980).
94. 653 F.2d at 532 n.9 (Tamm, J., dissenting).
95. 30 C.F.R. § 730.5(b) (1980).
96. See 653 F.2d at 532 n.9 (Tamm, J., dissenting). See also Surface Mining Oversight Hearings, supra note 59, at 5 (remarks of Sen. Randolph):
The Congress designed the Surface Mining law to insure equitable and uniform
regulation of the industry through use of the 'state window' concept. Flexibility
was built into the statute to provide latitude in implementing the legislation.
Unfortunately, I believe our flexibility was interpreted by the Office of Surface
Mining as an absence of position.
Wyoming Governor Herschler agreed:
As a practical matter . . • the window is closed. The regulations require excessive proof that a departure from the Federal regulations is warranted. Many
state officials believe that the required showing would be as expensive as a lawsuit. The result is particularly frustrating •.. [because) the federal regulations
go beyond the standards of the act to require specific procedures and techniques.
It follows that the States will be required to use procedures that clearly do not
fit nationwide. This is not what the Congress intended . • • •
Id. at 8.
97. See H.R. REP. No. 218, supra note 25, at 57, 129.
98. The states face individual problems that cannot be addressed adequately by a
uniform set of federal regulations. For instance, Western States receive considerably less
rainfall than coal-producing states in the East. Performance and reclamation standards
must take such climactic differences into account. Furthermore, different terrain in the
various coal-producing states requires diversification in mining techniques, reclamation
efforts, and environmental protection. See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(0 (Supp. ill 1979).
99. See 653 F.2d at 534 (Tamm, J., dissenting).
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the appropriate balance between the extremes of oppressive federal control and the haphazard state systems that arguably existed prior to passage of the Act. 100
The present administration is taking steps to achieve the
proper mix of authority under the SMCRA. Recent proposals by
the Secretary of the Interior would drastically reshape the surface mining program. The Office of Surface Mining has been
pared back, through the elimination of five regional offices and
some 400 jobs,101 in order to vest more power in the states. Furthermore, the Secretary has promulgated regulations that alter
the "state window" concept,102 so that states adopting alternatives to federal requirements "no longer are required to demonstrate that each alternative is necessary because of local requirements or local environmental or agricultural conditions. " 108 As
the administration recognizes, the future of Western coal production depends heavily upon striking a balance of authority
whereby every state will decide for itself "what is best for that
state, provided certain minimum federal requirements are
met."104
II.

SEVERANCE TAXES

The controversy over the proper scope of federal involvement
in state surface mining programs represents only one facet of the
tension between the West and the federal government regarding
coal policy. Another controversy, recently considered in the Supreme Court, centers upon the powers of the States to levy severance taxes on minerals.
During most of this century, states endowed with mineral resources - such as oil, gas, iron ore, and coal - have imposed
100. The 96th Congress considered enactment of a bill that would have solidified the
balance between state and federal interests. The bill, S. 1403, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979) (referred to as the Rockefeller Amendment), would have deleted the language of
SMCRA § 503(a)(7), 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(7) (Supp. III 1979), requiring state laws and
regulations to conform to the Secretary's regulations as well as the provisions of the
SMCRA. Although the bill died in committee in the House in both 1979 and 1980, it
would have guaranteed the states the flexibility necessary to structure individually their
programs to promote the goals and purposes of the SMCRA.
101. See [1981] 12 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 151.
102. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,376 (1981) (amending 30 C.F.R. §§ 730.5(b), 731.1, 731.13,
732.15(a)).
103. Id. at 53,377.
104. Letter from Warren White, Chairman, Coal Committee, Western Interstate
Energy Board, to U.S. Interior Secretary James G. Watt (June 17, 1981) [on file with the
Journal of Law Reform].
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taxes upon the severance of those resources. 105 Montana long has
been among those states charging a severance tax on coal. Until
1975 this tax was reasonably minimal, varying from twelve to
fourteen cents per ton according to heat content of the coal. 106
In 1975, however, Montana amended its severance tax schedules
dramatically, essentially raising the tax rate to thirty percent of
the extracted-coal price.107 Subsequent to this tax hike, the state
enacted a constitutional amendment requiring that half of all
severance-tax revenues be placed in a special trust fund not subject to appropriation without approval of three-fourths of the
state legislature. 106
The increased severance tax resulted from Montana's legitimate desire to avoid being left holding the environmental, economic, and social "bag" after exhaustion of the state's coal
reserves. Montana had experienced a dramatic rise in demand
for its coal over the past decade: coal produced through surface
mining within the state had risen from seven to thirty-three million tons between 1971 and 1979.109 The increased demand
105. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Severance Tax Hearings, supra note 15, at 21516 (statement of Rep. Williams).
106. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 615 P.2d 847, 849 (Mont. 1980),
aff'd, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
107. MoNT. ConE ANN. § 15-35-103 (1979). The section reads as follows:
(1) A severance tax is imposed on each ton of coal produced in the state in
accordance with the following schedule:
Heating Quality
Surface
Underground
(Btu per pound of coal)
Mining
Mining
Under 7,000

12 cents or
20% of value

5 cents or
3% of value

7,000-8,000

22 cents or
30% of value

8 cents or
4% of value

8,000-9,000

34 cents or
30% of value

10 cents or
4% of value

Over 9,000

40 cents or
30% of value

12 cents or
4% of value

"Value" means the contract sales price.
(2) The formula which yields the greater amount of tax in a particular case
shall be used at each point on this schedule.
(3) A person is not liable for any severance tax upon 20,000 tons of the coal he
produces in a calendar year.
108. MoNT. CoNsT., art. IX, § 5.
109. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 615 P.2d 847, 850 (Mont. 1980), aff'd,
101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
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stemmed in large part from provisions of the Clean Air Act
favoring low-sulphur coal such as that found in Montana. 110 Because this coal is recovered in Montana primarily through surface mining, the substantial deleterious environmental effects resulting from a surge in demand are apparent. Indeed, Montana
already has suffered the effects of intensive mineral development. Copper mining near Butte resulted in a disgraceful mess,
partly due to inadequate taxation of the activity. 111 The state
legislature was determined to avoid a similar experience with
surface mining.
The national interest in the increased state tax, however, was
substantial. Montana possesses approximately one-quarter of
the nation's coal reserves112 - enough to supply the entire country with coal for the next fifty years. 113 Some studies predict
that Montana, along with Wyoming, will be supplying one-third
of the nation's coal needs by 1990, a threefold increase from
1977.114 Due to the importance of Montana coal, reaction to the
severance tax from producers and electric utilities across the
country was predictably hostile. Several coal companies and
electric power companies brought suit, seeking a· declaratory
judgment that the tax unconstitutionally burdened interstate
commerce and frustrated federal energy policies.
The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the Montana
state courts finding the severance tax constitutional.1111 In order
to assess whether the tax violated the commerce clause as an
110. The Clean Air Act of 1970 was drafted in such a way, with regard to new sources
of pollution, that use of low-sulphur coal became an inexpensive way of complying with
standards set by EPA. These standards ostensibly required the best available control
technology, but were only set as a numerical standard, i.e., amount of sulphur dioxide
emissions allowable. Most utilities discovered it was cheaper to meet these requirements
by using low-sulphur Western coal than by installing scrubbers. The 1977 Amendments,
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7428 (Supp. m 1979), require the best available technology and a
reduction of emissions. This now requires scrubbers regardless of whether the coal used
is low- or high-sulphur. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 187-88, reprinted in
[1977) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1265-67; Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New
Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466 (1980). See also Sierra Club v.
Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding latest new-source performance
standards).
111. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 615 P.2d 847, 850 (Mont. 1980),
atf'd, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981). See generally A. GUTFIELD, MONTANA'S AGONY (1979).
112. See ENERGY FACTBOOK, supra note 14, at 582. Seventy-five percent of these
reserves are federally owned but subject to the tax nonetheless. Severance Tax Hearings,
supra note 15, at 30 (statement of Phil Gramm).
·
113. Severance Tax Hearings, supra note 15, at 22 (statement of Bruce F. Vento).
114. Id.
115. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981), atf'g 615 P.2d
847 (Mont. 1980).
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undue burden on interstate commerce,116 the court applied a
four-part test first formulated in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady. m Under this test, a state tax does not violate the commerce clause if (1) it is applied to an activity having a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) it is fairly apportioned, (3) it
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) it is
fairly related to services provided by the state.116
As the first two prongs of. the Complete Auto Transit test
were not disputed, 119 the majority focused its inquiry on the
test's third and fourth elements. Appellants contended that the
severance tax discriminated against interstate commerce because
ninety perc.ent of Montana coal is shipped out-of-state, thus unduly burdening non-Montana consumers. The Court properly
found no discrimination against interstate commerce merely because out-of-state coal consumers were paying more severance
taxes. The tax rate did not vary according to the final destination of the coal,120 so that in fact "the tax burden is borne according to the amount of coal consumed and not according to
, any distinction between in-state and out-of-state consumers."121
Appellants argued further that Montana's severance tax bore
n0 fair relation to the services provided by the State, in violation
of the fourth element of the Complete Auto Transit test. The
Court, noting that appellants had "completely misunderstood
the nature of the inquiry under the fourth prong,"122 rejected
the premise that the Complete Auto Transit test required a re~
lationship between tax revenues and costs incurred from a particular activity. 128 Rather, the fourth prong of Complete Auto
Transit requires that the general revenue tax in questionm be
116. As a threshold matter, the Court held that commerce clause constraints were
applicable to the state severance tax. 101 S. Ct. at 2952-53. The Montana Supreme
Court, drawing upon the authority of Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245
(1922), had found the severance tax immune from commerce clause scrutiny because the
taxable event, severance of coal by mining, preceded entry of the coal into interstate
commerce. 615 P.2d at 854. The Supreme Court disapproved the suggestion of Heisler
and its progeny that commerce clause constraints would not apply to taxes imposed.on
goods before their entry into interstate commerce, noting that taxes prior to "entry" into
commerce could nonetheless substantially affect interstate commerce. 101 S. Ct. at 2953.
117. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
118. Id. at 277-78.
119. 101 S. Ct. at 2954.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2956.
123. Id. at 2958. Indeed, "interstate commerce may be required to contribute to the
cost of providing all governmental services, including those services from which it arguably receives no direct 'benefit'." Id. at 2959 n.16.
124. The Court found no reason to question the Montana Supreme Court's character-
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"assessed in proportion to a taxpayer's activities or presence in a
State."1211 The Montana tax satisfied this requirement because
tax liability, measured as a percentage of the coal taken, increased in direct relation to appellants' activities within Montana.126 Given this relationship between the measure of the tax
and the extent of contacts with the state, the Court was willing
to defer to the legislative resolution127 of the appropriate level or
rate of taxation. 128
Appellants also challenged the Montana severance tax on
supremacy clause grounds, contending that the tax conflicted
with the amended version of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of
1920129 and federal statutes meant to encourage coal production.1so In fact, however, language within the Mineral Leasing
Act specifically authorizes states to impose severance taxes upon
lessees of federal mines. 1s1 Furthermore, the Court - while acknowledging the general federal policy, reflected by numerous
statutes, in encouraging coal production - found no specific
congressional intent to preempt state severance taxes.1s2
The Court's approach to the Montana tax, endorsing proporization of the severance tax as a general revenue tax.Id. at 2956.
125. Id. at 2959.
126. Id. at 2958-59.
127. The Court noted that Congress could intercede should a particular state tax be
found contrary to federal interests. Id. at 2959.
128. The Court was correct in its assessment that the rate and circumstances of a
severance tax should be policy decisions left to the legislature. The social, political, and
economic factors underlying severance taxes are quite complex and vary from state to
state. Thus, the Court properly did not attempt to identify a point at which a state tax
would constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce.
In regard specifically to the Montana tax, the real impact upon interstate commerce is
less than might appear at first glance, because the tax is levied upon the coal's value at
the time of severance. A 30% tax assessed upon severance gives little indication of the
impact the tax will have upon the final sale price of coal at its out-of-state destination.
For example, the Montana Supreme Court noted that the sale price f.o.b. mine for Montana coal destined for Texas is $7 per ton, creating a tax liability of $2.10 per ton. The
same coal, however, is priced at $30 per ton in Texas - so that the severance tax represents only 7% of the total cost of Montana c·oal to a Texas utility. See Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana, 625 P.2d 847, 856 (1980), aff'd, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
129. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (Supp. Ill 1979).
130. Specifically, appellants argued that the tax would frustrate and impair the national energy policies reflected in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, § 2(6),
42 U.S.C. § 6201(6) (Supp. III 1979), and the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of
1978, § 830l(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § E3301(b)(3) (Supp. Ill 1979).
131. The Court discovered "nothing in language or legislative history of either the
1920 Act or the 1975 Amendments to support appellants' assertion that Congress intended to maximize and capture all 'economic rents' from the mining of federal coal."
101 S. Ct. at 2961. The Montana tax did not abridge the congressional intent to obtain a
"fair return to the public" from the mining of federal lands. Id.
132. Id. at 2960-64.
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tional tax schemes while placing flat rates under closer scrutiny,
heads in the proper direction. The decision gives lower courts a
starting point for assessing the validity of severance taxes, while
avoiding the difficulties of detailed factual inquiries into actual
effects upon interstate commerce. Although the decision opens
the door for percentage severance tax rates exceeding those
imposed in Montana,133 the Court made clear the congressional
power to intercede when a tax interferes with federal
interests.134
The decision will have significant impact beyond Montana.
Wyoming, for example, exacts severance and ad valorem taxes at
an effective combined rate of approximately seventeen and onehalf percent. 135 While other Western States levy substantially
lower severance taxes on coal, the sentiments that motivated the
Montana legislature might influence other states as well. Indeed,
most Western States are similar to Montana: they are sparsely
populated and have insubstantial in-state coal needs relative ·to
their production capacity. Severance taxes represent a means of
financing responses to the impact arising from intensive coal
mining operations which satisfy the needs of electric utilities
and industries located elsewhere. These taxes are not imposed
by the Western States in order to reap "windfall profits" from
the increasing demand for coal. Rather, vast amounts of money
are necessary to ameliorate the adverse impacts of increased
production,138 to provide additional government services and
planning efforts as support for mining operations, and to expand
133. In dissent, Justice Blackmun ar~ed that the majority's reasoning would permit
a tax rate of 100 or even 1,000 percent of ~alue. 101 S. Ct. at 2968 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Moreover, he asserted that ;'the Court's analysis indicates that Montana's severance
tax would not run afoul of the· Commerce Clause even if it raised sufficient revenue to
allow Montana to eliminate all other taxes upon its citizens." Id.
134. Id. at 2959. See note 127 and accompanying text supra.
135. WYOMING STAT. §§ 39-6-302, 303 (1977 & Supp. 1981).
136. An example of the impact upon communities involved in energy development
can be gleaned from testimony of Congressman Cheny of Wyoming during consideration
of legislation to establish a ceiling on severance taxes. Although the resource involved is
not coal, the example is instructive of community needs similar to those anticipated in
coal regions:
If we look at the city of Evanston in the southwest corner of the State [Wyoming), a small community of 7,500 now; it faces an average annual growth rate of
29 percent because of the oil boom in the overthrust belt. This one community
needs 800 new single-family homes or apartments within the next year; they
need 1,800 trailer court lots now; they need new sewer system improvements
immediately; they need additional well and water storage facilities, a new police
building, a new jail, additional police officers, a brand new hospital, new doctors,
a 15-percent cost-of-living increase for the employees of the town.
Severance Tax Hearings, supra note 15, at 173.
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the States' economic bases beyond a dependency upon energy
developers.
The Western States recognize the need to develop their resources' for the sake of the nation's energy future, and do not
relish being pitted in a struggle of the "West against the rest." 187
Thus, understandable consternation arises in these States when
they are not trusted with development of resources within their
boundaries.
Such distrust was manifested in legislation introduced in the
96th Congress which would have placed a ceiling of twelve and
one-half percent on severance taxes. 188 Diverse advocates of the
legislation contended that. such a limitation was necessary to
prevent Montana and other coal-producing states from taking
unfair advantage of their abundant coal reserves. 139 Although
congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce likely
. would extend to a limitation on severance taxes,140 this approach
should be avoided as a matter of policy. Professor Tribe asserts
that "Congress cannot deny the states some revenue with which
to operate, some sphere of autonomous lawmaking competence,
and some measure of choice in selecting a political structure."141
Legislatio~ which contemplates absolute limits on severance
taxes, by preventing unique solutions to the particular problems
arising from coal development, effectively denies states the necessary measure of autonomy described by Tribe.142 The states'
137. See generally Surface Mining Oversight Hearings, supra note 59; Severance
Tax Hearings, supra note 15. New Mexico's policy, for instance, intends
to assure that taxation of energy resources provide[s] a fair share of tax revenues
to the State and that these revenues are sufficient to provide for the costs imposed by energy development and include compensation to present and future
generations for the depletion of energy resources without jeopardizing future energy development. In addition, with respect to coal •.• , tax revenues from [its]
extraction should be maximi2ed with due consideration given to the continued
profitability of existing operations and the maintenance of an attractive investment climate for future operations.
N.M. ENERGY AND MINERALS DEP'T, NEw MExtco STATE ENERGY PLAN 43 (1978).
138. See S. 2695, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 6625, H.R. 6654, & H.R. 7163,
96th Cong., 2d Seas. (1980). Similar bills have been introduced in the 97th Congress. See
S. 178, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981).
139. See generally Severance Tax Hearings, supra note 15; Note, The Increasing
Conflict Between State Coal Severance Taxation and Federal Energy Policy, 57 TEx. L.
REV. 675 (1979). The Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition warned that high severance taxes may create "a kind of United American Emirates" of energy-rich states
seeking to beggar their energy-poor neighbors. Hagstrom, The Severance Tax Is the Big
Gun In the Energy War Between the States, 13 NAT'L J. 1544, 1544 (1981).
140. See 101 S. Ct. at 2959; note 126 and accompanying text supra.
141. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 302 (1978).
142. Remarks by Congressman Cheny of Wyoming illustrate the quandary facing the
Western States:
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rights and regionalism issues arising from intensive energy development in the West may indicate serious problems for the
region and the nation. "Regardless of what happens [to the severance tax legislation], the coal severance tax issue will continue
as a catalyst for a broadening debate over fiscal disparities between the energy-rich and energy-poor states."143 A limitation
on severance tax rates only compounds and unnecessarily complicates these matters.
CONCLUSION

Reasonable accommodation of competing state and federal interests is critical to satisfactory resolution of the problems and
possibilities arising from the Surface Mining Act and the issues
surrounding state severance taxes. While the federal government
may find restrictive actions attractive to achieve its energy
objectives, in fact any federal initiatives which place the West
. further at odds with the rest of the nation can only exacerbate
the country's energy ills. Further division between the Western
States and the federal government regarding development of
mineral resources makes the possibility of a comprehensive national energy plan increasingly less feasible.
This bleak picture, though, need not be the outcome of resolving the conflicts presented here. A brightened energy future can
be consistent with a healthy social, environmental, and economic
climate in the West - provided the federal government pursues
a sensitive policy which accommodates the legitimate concerns
of the Western States regarding the ill-effects of intensive coal
development.

We find ourselves in Wyoming in a difficult situation. We are not all that eager
to have the kind of development that is forecast for our state. We frankly have
the feeling that we are going to have a massive synthetic fuels industry in northeastern Wyoming because the folks in Seabrook or Harrisburg don't like nuclear
power, or the folks out of New Jersey don't like to drill for oil, or the Congress
won't open up the national petroleum reserve in Alaska.
We have moved forward because we feel it is important for the country to
support this kind of-effort to increase our energy resources here at home. The
price that has been extracted in terms of the severance ta:r. is modest and only
goes to meet [identifiable] needs . . . .
Severance Tax Hearings, supra note 15, at 191.
143. Hagstrom, supra note 139, at 1544.

